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CRIMINAL LAW
LUIS G. STELZNER* and JEFFREY BUCKELS**

INTRODUCTION
During the survey period, the appellate courts of New Mexico issued
opinions in several significant cases interpreting the requisite elements
of a variety of criminal offenses under New Mexico statutes. The courts
clarified the actus reus elements of possession of burglary tools, commercial gambling, child abuse, habitual offenders, and unlawful practice
of law; clarified the mental state requirements for criminal trespass, tax
fraud, and criminal contempt; considered the appropriate bases and procedures for revocations of bail and probation; and decided issues involving
the appropriate standard of appellate review, agreements not to prosecute,
and criminal court jurisdiction.
I. CLARIFICATION AND INTERPRETATION
OF ACTUS REUS ELEMENTS

Possession of Burglary Tools
In State v. Jennings,' the court of appeals interpreted the element of
the offense of possession of burglary tools which requires the possession

A.

of a "device or instrumentality ...

commonly used for the commission

of burglary .... "2In Jennings, the court held that where there is evidence
allowing a reasonable inference that tools possessed by defendants were
"actually used as burlgary tools," evidence that such tools are "commonly
used" as burglary tools is unnecessary. 3
In Jennings, police officers first observed two men inside a closed gas
station and then outside attempting to scale the building.4 The officers
then heard a metallic banging in an area where a stairway led to the
basement.5 The two men were arrested as they entered a van.' The officers
*Professor of Law, University of New Mexico.
**Member, Class of 1986, University of New Mexico School of Law.
1. 102 N.M. 89, 691 P.2d 882 (Ct. App. 1984).
2. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-16-5 (Repl. Pamp. 1984): "Possession of burglary tools consists of
having in the person's possession a device or instrumentality designed or commonly used for the
commission of burglary and under circumstances evincing an intent to use the same in the commission
of burglary."
3. 102 N.M. at 92, 691 P.2d at 885.
4. Id. at 90, 691 P.2d at 883.
5. Id. at 91, 691 P.2d at 884.
6. Id.
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frisked the two men and found a long-bladed screwdriver and a small
flashlight. 7 The officers testified that they had observed fresh marks,
seemingly from a screwdriver, at the lock of the bathroom door of the
station. 8 In addition, a padlock had been forcibly removed from the
basement door of the station.' The defendant claimed that the state had
put on no evidence that flashlights and screwdrivers are commonly used
burglary tools. 10
1 and State v. Blea,12 two
The court, relying on State v. Candelaria"
"deadly weapons" cases, read the "commonly used" language out of the
statute. There was little support in Candelariaand Blea for the court's
conclusion. While the court's decision to uphold the judgment of the trial
court was probably correct, the decision could have been based on a less
drastic rationale which would not have required a rewriting of the statute.
The court could simply have concluded that, based on the evidence and
on common experience, a jury might reasonably have concluded, even
in the absence of direct testimony by police officers, that screwdrivers
and flashlights are indeed commonly used in burglaries. In excising the
"commonly used" requirement from the statute, the court eliminated an
important limiting element in an offense requiring little actus reus in the
first place. Jennings raises a risk of criminalizing conduct which in ordinary circumstances would be innocent.
However, Jennings suggests an interpretation of the offense which
prosecutors should note carefully. The rationale of the decision suggests
that where there is no evidence of "actual use" of a tool in a burglary,
the prosecutor must put on evidence such as the testimony of an experienced police officer in the burglary unit that the particular tools involved
in an offense are "commonly used" as burglary tools. This could present
pitfalls for the prosecutor.
B. Commercial Gambling
In an interesting and intricately reasoned decision in State v. Owens,' 3
the court of appeals held that the commercial gambling statute 4 requires
more than one act of accepting or making a bet, but that commercial
gambling need not be for profit.
The defendant was convicted of twelve counts of commercial gam7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
I1. 97 N.M. 64, 636 P.2d 883 (Ct. App. 1981).
12. 100 N.M. 237, 668 P.2d 1114 (Ct. App. 1983).
13. 23 N.M. St. B. Bull. 1226 (Ct. App. 1984).
14. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-19-3(B) (Repl. Pamp. 1984): "Commercial gambling consists of...
B. receiving, recording or forwarding bets or offers to bet. .. ."
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bling. 15 The state's evidence at trial consisted primarily of a series of tape
recordings of telephone conversations between the defendant and a man
named Newman. 16 An expert in commercial gambling testified that the
conversations between the defendant and Newman indicated that twelve
bets had been placed on football games for a total of $26,500.00."7
The court of appeals observed that the commercial gambling statute is
8
designed to proscribe the activities of bookmakers.' Thus, proof of commercial gambling requires more than one bet or offer to bet, although
9
one act of betting is sufficient for conviction of social gambling.' There
is no need, however, for the prosecution to prove a profit motive in order
to obtain a conviction of commercial gambling. 20 Finally, the court rejected the trial court's interpretation of the commercial gambling statute
and held that the distinction between social and commercial gambling
2
does not depend on whether the bet is offered or accepted. '
In sum, the court of appeals clarified in Owens the distinction between
social and commercial gambling. The difference hinges on whether the
prosecution can prove multiple instances of the taking or receiving of
bets. 2
C. Child Abuse
In State v. Leal,23 the court of appeals reaffirmed the doctrine of Smith
v. State24 that where a defendant is convicted on a theory which has no
evidentiary support and based on instructions which should not have been
given, the conviction must be reversed-and in many instances the defendant discharged-even though the defendant could have been convicted of a greater offense on a different theory.25
In Leal, the defendant was convicted of "permitting a child to be...
tortured, cruelly confined, or cruelly punished" in violation of N.M. Stat.
Ann. § 30-6-1(C)(2) (Repl. Pamp. 1984).26 The state adduced substantial
evidence at trial that the defendant herself had caused the abuse; however,
the record did not contain evidence from which a reasonable inference
could be drawn that another person caused the abuse, and that the de15. Owens, 23 N.M. St. B. Bull. at 1227.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.at 1229.
19. Id.
20. Id. Though it may accord with the statutory language to impose no requirement of profit
motive for "commercial"gambling, it may outrage the English language.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. 23 N.M. St. B. Bull. 1021 (Ct. App. 1984).
24. 89 N.M. 770, 558 P.2d 39 (1976).
25. Leal, 23 N.M. St. B. Bull. at 1022.
26. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-6-1(C)(2) (Repl. Pamp. 1984).
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fendant "permitted" it.27 As the court observed, one does not "permit"
oneself to do an act.28 Because there was not substantial evidence to
support the conviction for permitting child abuse, the court ordered the
conviction reversed and the defendant discharged.29 In essence, the defendant was acquitted on the only charge presented, i.e., "permitting"
the child to be abused. Therefore, under the double jeopardy clause, the
defendant could not be tried a second time for that offense. 30
In the Leal opinion, however, it is not clear that the defendant could
not have been tried on the theory that she "caused" the child to be abused.
Leal serves as a reminder to the courts and prosecutors in cases where
different crimes are lumped together in one offense, under one heading,
to be careful to instruct the jury and charge the defendant on a theory
which is consistent with the facts of the case.
D. Habitual Offenders
In State v. Burk,3 the court of appeals considered whether a proceeding
in another state in which the defendant pleads guilty, but where adjudication of guilt is deferred during the pendency of probation, constitutes
a "conviction" for purposes of the New Mexico Habitual Offender Act.32
The court held that since the state of Texas had deferred not only the
defendant's sentence but also the adjudication of his guilt, there was no
"conviction" as required under the Habitual Offender Act. Thus,
the
proceeding in Texas could not be used in New Mexico to enhance the
defendant's sentence.33 Even though New Mexico and federal law consider a guilty plea sufficient for enhancement, under Texas law there was
no conviction and without a conviction there could be no enhancement.34
Thus, while the definition of "felony" for purposes of the Habitual Offender Act depends on New Mexico law (i.e., whether the offense was
punishable by imprisonment for more than one year or would have been
otherwise classified as a felony in New Mexico), the definition of "conviction" depends on the procedural rules and the substantive law of the
state in which the alleged "conviction" took place.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. See Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1 (1979).
31. 101 N.M. 263, 680 P.2d 980 (Ct. App. 1984).
32. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 31-18-17(A)(2)(a) (Cum. Supp. 1985): "A. For purposes of this section,
'prior felony conviction' means ... (2) any prior felony for which the person was convicted other
than an offense triable by court martial if: (a) the conviction was rendered by a court of another
state.
....
"

33. 101 N.M. at 265, 680 P.2d at 982.
34. Id.
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E. Unlawful Practice of Law
In State v. Edwards," the court of appeals interpreted the statute prohibiting the practice of law without a license.36 The court confronted the
question whether the filing of five different pleadings on different dates
but in the same action constituted one continuing violation of the statute
or five separate violations. The defendant had been convicted in the district
37
court of five counts of practicing law without a license. The court of
appeals held that the defendant's multiple activities on behalf of a single
38
client in a single cause of action constituted one continuing offense.
At the outset the court determined that the defendant was not barred
from raising the issue on appeal for the first time, because his claim was
one that amounted to a defense of double jeopardy which could be claimed
for the first time on appeal." The court reasoned that if the legislature,
in enacting the criminal statute, had not intended to authorize separate
convictions and sentences for the filing of each pleading in a single action,
then the sentence in this case would constitute multiple punishments for
a single offense, thus violating the double jeopardy clause." The court
concluded that the legislative intent of protecting the unwary and uninformed public from injury at the hands of persons unskilled or unlearned
in the law would be fulfilled if the defendant in this case were found
4
liable for only one act of unauthorized practice of law. " Additionally, the
court observed that if the filing of each pleading in a single cause of
action constituted a separate criminal offense, then every act within the
context of unlawful representation would be a separate offense (e.g.,
42
phoning the client, talking with opposing counsel, etc.).
In Edwards, the court of appeals used a reasoned analysis of the legislative intent and the policy underlying the statute to arrive at a reasonable
interpretation of the scope of the offense. In essence, the court concluded
that, given the scope of the unlawful practice statute, all separate acts
within representation of a single client in a single action merge into one
offense.
35. 102 N.M. 413, 696 P.2d 1006 (Ct. App. 1984).
36. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 36-2-28 (Repl. Pamp. 1984): "If any person shall, without having become
duly licensed to practice, or whose licenses to practice shall have expired either by disbarment,
failure to pay his license fee or otherwise, practice or assume to act or hold himself out to the public
as a person qualified to practice or carry on the calling of a lawyer, he shall be guilty of an offense
under this act ....
37. 102 N.M. at 414, 696 P.2d at 1007.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 415, 696 P.2d at 1008.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 417, 696 P.2d at 1010.
42. Id. at 416, 696 P.2d at 1009.
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II. INTERPRETATION AND CLARIFICATION
OF MENTAL STATE REQUIREMENTS
A. CriminalTrespass
In State v. McCormack,43 the court of appeals interpreted the criminal

intent requirement for conviction of the offense of criminal trespass, and,
in doing so, reviewed concepts of general criminal intent and mistake of
law. The court held that criminal trespass is a general intent crime in
New Mexico and, therefore, the defense of mistake of law is not available
on that charge."
In preparation for a demonstration at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant
(WIPP) site near Carlsbad, the Department of Energy placed "no trespassing" signs and a sawhorse barricade on the road to the fenced workyard.45 This barricade was within the WIPP site but extended some 800
feet beyond the permanently fenced workyard. 46 The court found that
there was ample evidence that the demonstrators were warned not to cross
the barricade on pain of arrest for trespass. 7 The defendant, a reporter,
heard those warnings. 8 When some demonstrators crossed the barricade,
the defendant followed off to one side taking photographs." 9 He was

arrested well beyond the barricades.5 0
The defendant admitted on appeal that he had heard loudspeaker warnings to the crowd but claimed that he did not have the requisite intent to
commit criminal trespass because he did not believe the warnings applied
to the press. 5 The court treated McCormack's claim as a defense of
mistake of law, i.e., he claimed that he did not know he was violating
the law. 2 The court noted an amendment in the legislative session of
1981 removing the "malicious intent" requirement from the statute, and
concluded that criminal trespass is a general criminal intent crime."
Therefore, knowledge that one is violating the law is not an element of
the offense and thus a defense of mistake of law is unavailing. 4 A general
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

101 N.M. 349, 682 P.2d 742 (Ct. App. 1984).
Id. at 352, 682 P.2d at 745.
Id. at 351, 682 P.2d at 744.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 352, 682 P.2d at 745.
Id. at 351-52, 682 P.2d at 744-45.
Id. at 352, 682 P.2d at 745.
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intent crime requires only that the defendant deliberately do an act which
the law declares to be a crime.55
Assuming mistake of law to be the basis of the defendant's claim, the
court's reasoning is correct. However, the offense of criminal trespass
also requires that the defendant enter or remain without authorization or
permission "knowing that consent to enter had been denied or with"56 Arguably, the defendant's claim was simply that he did
drawn ..
not know that consent to enter had been denied to or withdrawn from the
press. This would constitute a mistake of fact defense, rendering the
court's treatment of his appeal incorrect. If the state produced insufficient
evidence to support a jury finding that the defendant "knew" that consent
to enter had been denied or withdrawn, then the defendant's appeal might
have had merit.
B. Tax Fraud
In State v. Sparks,57 the court of appeals considered the sufficiency of
the evidence introduced at trial that the defendant willfully made or
subscribed a fraudulent tax return in violation of N.M. Stat. Ann. §7-173(A) (Repl. Pamp. 1983). The defendant was in the business of purchasing tax returns from taxpayers and preparing the returns.5" In 1981,
he purchased returns from Frederick Thompson with the agreement that
the defendant would pay Thompson cash and take any refund paid by
the state.59 The return filled out and signed by the defendant listed Thompson as having five dependent children.' Thompson testified that the defendant never asked him whether he had any dependents and that he did
and did not recognize the names of the
not in fact have five children
"children" on the return. 6 The court concluded that there was substantial
evidence for a jury verdict that the defendant had willfully made a return
under penalty of perjury which he did not believe to be true and correct
55. Id. The Uniform Jury Instruction on general criminal intent states:
[Tihe state must prove to your satisfaction beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant acted intentionally when he committed the crime. A person acts intentionally when he purposely does an act which the law declares to be a crime,
[even though he may not know that his act is unlawful].
N.M. UJI. Crim. 1.50.
56. N.M. Stat. Ann. § 30-14-1 (Repl. Pamp. 1984) (emphasis added).
57. 102 N.M. 317, 694 P.2d 1382 (Ct. App. 1985).
58. Id. at 319, 694 P.2d at 1384.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 320, 694 P.2d at 1385.
61. Id. at 319-20, 694 P.2d at 1384-85.
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in every material matter.62 Further, the court equated the willful conduct
63 with general
requirement of §7-1-73(A)
criminal intent as defined in
4
U.J.I. Crim. 1.50.'

The court also ruled on the appropriate sentencing upon conviction of
a violation of N.M. Stat. Ann. § 7-1-73(A) (Repl. Pamp. 1983).65 This
issue arose because that section, while defining an offense, is not contained in the criminal code.' Subsection B of §7-1-73 states that anyone
found guilty of a violation of the statute "is guilty of a felony and upon
conviction thereof, shall be fined not more than five thousand dollars
($5,000.00) or imprisoned not less than six months nor more than three
years or both together with costs of prosecution." Reading the statute
literally, the trial court had sentenced the defendant to a minimum of six
months and a maximum of three years in prison67 However, the court
of appeals, applying N.M. Stat. Ann. §31-18-13(b) (1978), held that
"[w]henever a defendant is convicted of a crime under. . . a statute not
contained in the Criminal Code, which specifies the penalty to be imposed
on conviction, the court shall set as a definite term of imprisonment the
minimum term prescribed by such statute ...."68 Thus, the court of
appeals held that the district court erred in its sentencing and should have
imposed the minimum six months sentence for each count on which the
defendant was convicted. 69
C. Criminal Contempt
In In re Michael Stout (State v. McGhee),7 the court of appeals considered the mental state requirement and sufficiency of the evidence upon
the mental state requirement of criminal contempt. Attorney Stout was
convicted of indirect criminal contempt for failing to appear at a sentencing proceeding. 7 The uncontradicted evidence was that Stout was
62. Id. at 320, 694 P.2d at 1385.
63. "Any individual or person who: A. willfully makes and subscribes any return, statement or
other document which contains or is verified by a written declaration that it is made under the
penalties of perjury, and which he does not believe to be true and correct as to every material matter;
...is guilty of a felony...."
64. "A person acts intentionally when he purposely does an act which the law declares to be a
crime, [even though he may not know that his act is unlawful]. Whether the defendant acted
intentionally may be inferred from all the surrounding circumstances, such as the manner in which
he acts, the means used, [and] his conduct [and any statements made by him]."
The Use Note to UJI Crim. 1.50 states that the bracketed portions of the instruction should be
used "only if applicable."
65. Sparks, 102 N.M. at 325-26, 694 P.2d at 1389-90.
66. Id. at 325, 694 P.2d at 1389.
67. Id.at 326, 694 P.2d at 1390.
68. Id.at 325, 694 P.2d at 1389.
79. Id.at 326, 694 P.2d at 1390.
70. 102 N.M. 159, 692 P.2d 545 (Ct. App. 1984).
71. Id. at 160, 692 P.2d at 546.
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required to be in another courtroom in another city at the time of the
scheduled sentencing and had arranged with a colleague in the Office of
the Public Defender to represent the client at sentencing.72 However,
when the sentencing judge called the client's case, the replacement attorney announced that he was not prepared and moved for a continuance."
Subsequently, a hearing of sorts was held in the judge's chambers, where
Stout was given a chance to and did explain his absence and the measures
he had taken to provide representation at the sentencing.74 Nevertheless,
Stout was convicted of criminal contempt by the judge.
The court of appeals held that the offense of criminal contempt requires
a criminal state of mind, specifically a conscious attempt to violate a
court order.75 The court observed that "[i]nability without fault to comply
with the court's order is a defense to a contempt charge." '7 6 The court
found that because Stout had been in another court at the same time and
had arranged for substitute counsel and prepared substitute counsel for
the hearing, he had shown that he had no intent to violate the court's
order requiring his presence at the sentencing.7 Consequently, the court
7
of appeals reversed the trial court and instructed it to discharge Stout. "
In light of the rule in New Mexico that indirect contempt may be tried
by a judge who is the subject of the alleged contemptuous act, it is
particularly important that the court of appeals in Stout required a showing
of criminal intent for a conviction of criminal contempt. This requirement
not only increases the culpability required for a conviction, but also
provides some basis for a distinction between criminal and civil contempt.
III. REVOCATION OF PROBATION AND BAIL
A. No Contest Plea as Basis for ProbationRevocation
In State v. Baca,7 9 following the defendant's conviction in metropolitan
court for DWI-second and possession of less than one ounce of marijuana,
the court suspended his sentence and placed him on probation.'o One
condition of his probation was that he not be convicted subsequently of
any alcohol-related offense."' Approximately six weeks after conviction,
the defendant was arrested for DWI and entered a plea of no contest.2
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 160-61, 692 P.2d at 546-47.
Id. at 162, 692 P.2d at 547.
Id.
Id.
Id.
101 N.M. 415, 683 P.2d 970 (Ct. App. 1984).
Id. at 416, 683 P.2d at 971.
Id.
Id.
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On the basis of the no contest plea, the state moved to revoke the defendant's probation, and the metro court granted the motion.8 3 The district
court upheld the revocation on appeal."
The issue presented to the court of appeals was whether a conviction
based on a no contest plea can be used as the sole basis of a probation
revocation. 5 The court held that a plea of no contest is not the full
equivalent of a plea of guilty and, therefore, cannot be used as the sole
basis of a probation revocation.86
In the court's view, no contest pleas are indeed a tacit admission of
guilt; however, they are such an admission solely for purposes of the
cases in which they are entered.87 In Piassick v. United States,8 the Fifth
Circuit held that, though nolo contendere means "I do not contest it"
and clearly denotes an admission of guilt, the admission operates only
in the case in which it is entered.89 The court of appeals observed further
that a trial court has the discretion to refuse a no contest plea.' Fundamentally, the court considered that the public policy to promote plea
bargaining would be undermined if no contest pleas could be used as the
sole basis for probation revocations. 9
B. Time to Commence ProbationRevocation Proceedings
In the second case involving probation revocations, State v. Chavez,92
the court of appeals was presented with two issues: "(1) whether the
revocation of the defendant's suspended sentence was barred for failure
to commence revocation proceedings within a reasonable time; and (2)
whether the revocation proceedings were premature pending a final decision on the defendant's appeal in federal court. "93 The court affirmed
the probation revocation, finding for the state on both issues.
The defendant's first contention was that the five-month delay in the
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 417, 683 P.2d at 972.
id.
253 F.2d 658 (5th Cir. 1958).
Id. at 661. N.M. R. Crim. P. 21(g)(6) provides:
Inadmissibility of Plea Discussions. Evidence of ... a plea of no contest ...
or an offer to plead ... no contest . . . to the crime charged or any other crime,
or of statements made in connection with . . . the foregoing [plea] or [offer], is
not admissible in any civil or criminal proceeding against the person who made
the plea or offer.
The court in Baca held that Rule 21(g)(6) applies to proceedings in metropolitan, as well as in
district court. 101 N.M. at 417, 683 P.2d 972.
90. Baca, 101 N.M. at 418, 683 P.2d at 973.
91. Id.
92. 102 N.M. 279, 694 P.2d 927 (Ct. App. 1985).
93. Id. at 280-81, 694 P.2d at 928-29.
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initiation of the probation revocation proceedings was unreasonable and
prejudicial. 94 The court reasoned that although there are no specific mandatory time limits imposed by rule or statute in New Mexico, revocation
proceedings must be held within a reasonable time after authorities become aware of an alleged probation violation or after the probationer is
arrested.95 Aside from this reasonable time restriction, prosecutors may
initiate probation revocation proceedings before or after a probationer's
trial on related charges.9 6
The court found that regulatory and constitutional speedy trial protections are not applicable to probation revocation proceedings. However,
it ruled that delay in the institution and prosecution of probation revocation
proceedings-coupled with a showing of prejudice to the probationermay constitute a denial of due process.97
The court elaborated the factors to be considered in determining whether
a probation revocation hearing has been brought within a reasonable time.
These factors are the length of the delay, the reasons for the delay, and
98
the prejudice, if any, to the defendant resulting from the delay. Additionally, the court observed that the defendant's failure to request an
earlier hearing or his contribution to the delay may also be considered.'
These factors are quite similar to those considered in determining a constitutional deprivation of speedy trial rights. " In Chavez, the court held
that the delay by state authorities in initiating the defendant's probation
revocation proceedings until after the trial in federal court on the charges
that formed the basis of the alleged probation violation did not result in
prejudice to the probationer."'0 In the court's view, the defendant failed
to meet his burden of showing that he had demanded an earlier hearing
or was unable to call necessary witnesses on his behalf or that any of the
witnesses had problems remembering any critical events relevant to the
revocation proceeding. 0 2
The defendant's second contention was that the state acted prematurely
in initiating his probation revocation proceedings prior to determination
' The court held that,
of his appeal from his federal court convictions. 03
before or after appeal
motion
his
file
may
in New Mexico, a prosecutor
before or after trial
revocation
probation
for
is final, just as he may move
94. Id. at 281,
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 282,
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. See, e.g.,
101. 102 N.M.
102. Id.
103. Id.

694 P.2d at 929.
694 P.2d at 930.
Raburn v. Nash, 78 N.M. 385, 431 P.2d 874 (1967).
at 282, 694 P.2d at 930.
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on the charges underlying the motion."o4 In so holding, the court adopted
the position of the majority
of jurisdictions, including Arizona, Colorado,
05
and the Second Circuit. 1
C. Appeal of Bail Revocation
In the companion cases of State v. David and State v. Munoz,'" the
court of appeals considered the common issue as to the proper method
of appealing denials or revocations of bail. In David, the defendant's bail
was revoked because he had threatened to kill a witness.' 7 In Munoz,
the trial court had denied bail pursuant to article II, section 13, of the
New Mexico Constitution, which permits the trial court to deny bail for
sixty days when a defendant is accused of a felony and has previously
been convicted of two or more felonies within the state which are unrelated
to the alleged criminal transaction for which he is currently being charged. 0
The two defendants took different routes to appeal their denials of bail.
Munoz took direct appeal pursuant to Crim., Child Ct., Dom. Rel. and
W/C App. Rule 202 (Repl. Pamp. 1983);' David appealed pursuant to
New Mexico Rules of Criminal Procedure" ° and Crim. Child Ct., Dom.
Rel. and W/C App. Rule 204.
The court of appeals noted that some confusion had arisen regarding
the method of perfecting appeals from orders denying or revoking bail. "'
The confusion seems to have arisen because statutory and regulatory
provisions cover review of conditions of release. 2 But obviously, as the
court observed, no "conditions" were set in the Munoz and David cases.I ,3
There can be no conditions of release if there is no bond. Rule 204 of
the Rules of Criminal Appellate Procedure provides for review of conditions of release. "' Nevertheless, the court held that Rule 204 "provides
the most appropriate means for appeal" in cases of denial or revocation
of bail. With respect to the Munoz case, the court reasoned that article
104. Id.
105. See Roberson v. State of Connecticut, 501 F.2d 305 (2d Cir. 1974); People v. Salazar, 568
P.2d 101 (Co. Ct. App. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1039 (1978); and State v. Barnett, 540 P.2d
684 (Az. 1975) (en banc).
106. 102 N.M. 138, 692 P.2d 524 (Ct. App. 1984).
107. Id.at 140, 692 P.2d at 526.
108. Id. N.M. CONST. art. II, § 13 states: "All persons shall be bailable by sufficient sureties,
except for capital offenses when the proof is evident or the presumption great. Excessive bail shall
not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted."
109. David, 102 N.M. at 141, 692 P.2d at 527.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
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II, section 13, requires that appeals from orders denying bail shall be
given preference over all other matters, and, in the court's view, Rule
6
204 provides "the most expeditious method" for giving preference."
IV. OTHER CASES
A. Appropriate Standard of Appellate Review
In State v. Chapman,"7 the state supreme court considered the scope
of appellate review of the jury's finding that the respondent was competent
to stand trial. The court of appeals had determined that the state's evidence
had failed to establish that the respondent could rationally consult with
his attorney with a reasonable degree of understanding or that he could
rationally perceive and comprehend the events in question. ," Consequently, the court of appeals reversed the trial court's finding of comfinding that
petence. 9 The supreme court reversed the court of appeals,
20 In so doing, the
jury.'
the
it had substituted its judgment for that of
supreme court established a deferential scope of appellate review for
findings of competency to stand trial.
In reaching this conclusion, the supreme court observed that the apbe
propriate burden of proof in a competency proceeding is that the state
2 ' The
evidence.'
the
of
a
preponderance
required to prove competence by
appropriate standard of appellate review, however, is the traditional one
of "substantial evidence" or such relevant evidence as is acceptable to a
reasonable mind.' 22 The appellate court must not substitute its judgment
for that of the jury, but must defer to the jury's finding as long as it is
23
supported by substantial evidence.' Moreover, jurors are not bound by
or required to accept the opinions of experts presented at the competency
' In this case, despite the fact that the defendant twice previously
hearing. 24
had been found incompetent to stand trial, the court found25that the record
showed substantial evidence to support the jury verdict.'
116. Id. at 143, 692 P.2d at 529.
117. 101 N.M. 478, 684 P.2d 1143 (1984).
118. Id. at 478, 684 P.2d at 1143.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 479, 684 P.2d at 1144.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 480, 684 P.2d at 1145.
124. ld. at 479, 684 P.2d at 1144.
125. Id. at 480, 684 P.2d at 1145. Justice Walters filed a dissenting opinion, claiming that
substantial evidence of competence had not been presented to the jury. Chapman, 101 N.M. 478,
480, 684 P.2d 1143, 1145 (1984) (Waiters, J., dissenting). Justice Walters observed that it was
uncontradicted that the defendant's entire capability of communicating with his attorney centered
upon his delusional perception of the surrounding facts and that, therefore, he could not assist his
attorney in formulating a rational defense. Id.
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B. Agreements Not to Prosecute
In State v. John Doe, 26
' the court of appeals considered the question
of the enforceability of an agreement not to prosecute. The court concluded that such an agreement can be enforced against the state if it has
been duly consummated and complies with the requirements of due process. 127
In Doe, the defendant had entered into an agreement drafted by his
attorney that he was "to aid the state in the search and seizure of controlled
substances which may lead to the arrest of individuals in possession of
said substances .. .[F]or each three individuals [defendant] assists the
state in the search and seizure process leading to the arrest of that individual, one charge . .. will be dismissed. 1 28 Based on the facts, the
trial court found that the defendant had not complied with the agreement,
and the court of appeals agreed.' 29 Further, the court of appeals set forth
the procedure to be followed by the trial court in considering the enforceability of such agreements. The trial court must examine the totality
of the circumstances and the exact agreement of the parties and ascertain
whether a refusal to comply with the agreement would deny the defendant
of due process of law. 3 0 In this case, the court concluded that the state's
refusal to comply with the agreement did not constitute a denial of due
process. 13,
C. Jurisdiction:Prosecution by Private Counsel
Finally, in State v. Baca, 31 2 the court of appeals considered the question
whether either the district court or the metropolitan court had jurisdiction
to try a defendant who was prosecuted in metropolitan court by private
counsel. The court of appeals held that neither court had jurisdiction over
Baca's case.133
The Baca case arose out of a fight between a teacher and a former
student.'34 The teacher filed a private complaint in metropolitan court
alleging assault and battery.' 35 Baca filed a cross-complaint against the
teacher also alleging assault and battery.' 36 The district attorney's office
suggested mediation. When it became apparent that mediation would not
126. 23 N.M. St. B. Bull 1333 (Ct. App. 1984).
127. Id.at 1335.
128. Id.at 1334.
129. Id.at 1336.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. 101 N.M. 716, 688 P.2d 34 (Ct. App. 1984).
133. Id.at 716, 688 P.2d at 34.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
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succeed, the district attorney's office withdrew from the case, claiming
that the filing of the cross-complaint created a conflict of interest for the
district attorney's office.' 37 The district attorney's office also informed
the public defender representing Baca that the filing of the cross-complaint
changed the case to a civil action and that the public defender would also
have to withdraw. 38 The district attorney's office indicated to the public
defender that the matter would be reset on a civil calendar.139 However,
the case remained on the criminal docket and went to trial.' 40
At trial, the teacher was represented by private counsel, who prosecuted
the case. 4' Baca appeared pro se, but shortly before trial a public defender
was allowed to sit at Baca's table in order to assist him. 42 The metropolitan court dismissed Baca's cross-complaint and found him guilty of
assault and battery. 143 After a trial de novo, the distict court also found
him guilty of assault and battery. "
Baca contended both at the district court and before the court of appeals
that the metropolitan court lacked jurisdiction to hear the case as a criminal
matter and that this deprived the district court of jurisdiction to render a
verdict after a trial de novo. 145 In a related argument, he contended that
there was no evidence on the record that private counsel for the teacher
had been appointed as an associate attorney for the district attorney, nor
metropolitan court order had issued approving such an appointthat any
46
ment. 1
The court of appeals reasoned that the metropolitan court lacked criminal jurisdiction over the case, if in fact it was prosecuted by an attorney
without authority. 147 N.M. Stat. Ann. § 36-1-19 (Repl. Pamp. 1984) prohibits anyone other than the district attorney's office from representing
the state in a criminal proceeding "except on order of the court and with
the consent of those offices.' 48 Thus, the court concluded, the issue of
whether the teacher's attorney had authority to prosecute the case in
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
.148.

Id.
Id. at 717, 688 P.2d at 35.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. See N.M. Stat. Ann. § 36-1-19 (Repl. Pamp. 1984):
[N]o one shall represent the state or any county thereof in any matter in which
the state or county is interested except the attorney general, his legally appointed
and qualified assistants or the district attorney or his legally appointed and
qualified assistants, and such associate counsel as may appear on order of the
court, with the consent of the attorney general or district attorney. ...
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metropolitan court depended on the existence of two facts: (1) that the
district attorney's office had granted permission, and (2) that an order of
the metropolitan court had issued approving the authority. 149 In this case,
the court found that the record disclosed neither type of approval and
therefore proper authority was not vested in private counsel to prosecute
the case."'5 Absent this authority, the court concluded that the metropolitan
court lacked criminal jurisdiction to proceed and therefore the district
court also lacked jurisdiction to hear the case on the de novo appeal. 'i
The court therefore vacated the judgment and sentence of5the
district court
2
and remanded with instructions to dismiss the charges. 1

149. Baca, 101 N.M. at 717, 688 P.2d at 35.
150. Id. at 718, 688 P.2d at 36.
151. Id. The district court's jurisdiction to hear a de novo appeal is limited by the jurisdiction of
the metropolitan court from which the appeal originated. See State v. Lynch, 82 N.M. 532, 484
P.2d 374 (Ct. App. 1971).
152. Baca, 101 N.M. at 718, 688 P.2d at 36.

